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Quantum coherence was recently formalized as a physical resource to measure the strength of
superposition. Based on the resource theory, we present a systematic framework that connects a co-
herence measure to the security of quantum key distribution. By considering a generic entanglement-
based key distribution protocol under the collective attack scenario, we show that the key rate can
be quantified by the coherence of the shared bipartite states. This framework allows us to derive the
key rate of the BB84 and six-state protocols. By utilizing fine-grained parameters, we also derive
the improved key rates of both protocols within the coherence-based framework. Furthermore, we
apply it to a practical issue, detection efficiency mismatch, and obtain an improved result. In con-
clusion, this framework demonstrates the interplay among coherence, entanglement, and quantum
key distribution at a fundamental level.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
As the notion that captures the quantum superposition between differentiable physical states, quantum coherence
represents one of the fundamental features that distinguish quantum mechanics from its classical counterpart [1, 2].
Despite of the early recognition of its importance, quantum coherence was only recently formalized under a rigourous
framework of resource theory [3], which stimulated a rapidly growing research field on quantum coherence, ranging
from its mathematical characterizations to its operational interpretations [4].
The motivation for studying the operational interpretation of quantum coherence is two-folded. First, by linking
coherence to the operational advantage of quantum information processing protocols, one can improve existing pro-
tocols and derive other ones by exploiting similar mechanisms. Second, the observable phenomenon bestowed by
quantum coherence allows one to better understand the boundary between quantum and classical realms, one of the
fundamental problems in theoretical physics.
The operational significance of quantum coherence has been recognized in many areas, including quantum metrol-
ogy [5], quantum computing [6], quantum thermodynamics [7, 8] and quantum biology [9]. With the developed
resource theory of coherence, more operational significance of coherence was discovered and quantified [10–15]. Re-
cently, it was shown that coherence quantifies the amount of unpredictable intrinsic randomness from measuring
quantum states [16, 17]. Such a relation has been applied to develop source-independent quantum random number
generators [18]. Taking a qubit as an example, the state |ψA〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/
√
2 can yield intrinsic randomness when
measured in the Z basis, which is unpredictable to an adversary, Eve. In comparison, the measurement result of
ρA = (|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|)/2 with zero coherence can be fully determined by Eve if she holds the purification of ρA, that
is, |ψAE〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2.
In this paper, we investigate the significant role of coherence played in quantum key distribution (QKD), via
considering the relation between coherence and intrinsic randomness. In the scenario of QKD, two legitimate users,
Alice and Bob, intend to share a sequence of private and identical bits, called the secret key. In a QKD security
analysis, one always needs to consider two steps in postprocessing. One is information reconciliation that ensures the
keys shared by Alice and Bob are identical. The other is privacy amplification that extracts the secure key from the raw
key. In general, information reconciliation is a standard classical process, while privacy amplification is determined by
the quantum procedures of the protocol. Privacy amplification plays a central role in all security proofs. For example,
in the Shor-Preskill security proof [19], privacy amplification is linked to the phase error correction in an equivalent
entanglement protocol [20]. In this paper, we examine the postprocessing in an alternative way. After information
reconciliation, the amount of secret key that can be extracted from privacy amplification is essentially determined
by the intrinsic randomness that is unknown to Eve. This intrinsic randomness can be quantified by the coherence
of the joint system of Alice and Bob. For example, in the entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol [21, 22],
supposing there are only phase errors left, the final state shared by Alice and Bob is a mixture of (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2
and (|00〉 − |11〉)/√2. If the phase error rate takes the worst case of 50%, the state becomes (|00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11|)/2,
which has no coherence in the Z basis, and hence no secret key can be generated.
Following this spirit, we propose a generic security analysis framework for QKD under collective attacks, and we
show that the key generation rate is closely related to the amount of coherence within the joint quantum states. To be
more specific, we find that the security of the key originates from the coherence of the bipartite quantum state shared
by Alice and Bob. Our framework is concise, and is one via which one can derive the final key rate formulas of the
BB84 protocol [19, 21] and the six-state protocol [23, 24]. Moreover, the proposed framework allows one to improve
the key rates with fine-grained parameters. Many existing QKD security analyses [19, 20] are based on entanglement
distillation protocols [25], where entanglement is taken as an essential resource to guarantee the security of the final
key. In fact, entanglement is a precondition for secure QKD [26]. Thus, we also discuss the interplay among coherence,
entanglement, and QKD security. Later, the potential approach to extend our results from the scenario of collective
attacks to the one of coherent attacks will be discussed.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review the close relation between quantum coherence and intrinsic
randomness. In Sec. III, we introduce the security analysis framework based on quantifying coherence, and present
an explicit key rate formula related to the coherence of the bipartite state in the key generation basis. In Sec. IV,
by applying the framework to the BB84 and six-state protocols, we reproduce the original key rate formulas. Then,
in Sec. V, with analytical tools well developed under the resource theory of coherence, we improve the key rates of
these two protocols by using fine-grained parameters in postprocessing the measurement outcomes. Furthermore, in
Sec. VI, we apply the framework to solve a practical issue in QKD, detection efficiency mismatch, where two detectors
have nonidentical detection efficiency. The derived key rate shows an advantage over previous analyses. We also
discuss the interplay among coherence, entanglement, and QKD security in Sec. VII. Finally, we conclude our work
and discuss future works in Sec. VIII.
3II. PRELIMINARY: COHERENCE AND INTRINSIC RANDOMNESS
The resource framework of coherence was recently formalized [3]. A comprehensive review of this topic can be
found in Ref. [4] and references therein. Here, we briefly review the concepts involved in this paper.
The free state and the free operation are two elementary ingredients in all resource theories. In the context of coher-
ence theory, considering a d-dimensional Hilbert space Hd and a reference (computational) basis I = {|i〉}i=1,2,...,d, the
free state is the state which is diagonal in the reference basis, i.e., δ =
∑d
i=1 δi|i〉〈i|; the free operation is an incoherent
complete positive and trace preserving operation, which cannot generate coherence from incoherent states. Based on
this coherence framework, several measures are proposed to quantify the superposition strength of the reference basis,
such as relative entropy of coherence [3], which is defined as
C(ρ) = S
(
ρdiag
)− S(ρ). (1)
where ρdiag is the diagonal state of ρ in the reference basis,
∑
i 〈i|ρ|i〉|i〉〈i|, and S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log2(ρ)] is the von
Neumann entropy of ρ.
On the other hand, intrinsic randomness is unpredictable compared with the pseudo-randomness produced by
deterministic algorithms. A quantum random number generator (QRNG) serves as an elegant solution to the intrinsic
randomness generation, via measuring quantum state in well-designed methods [27, 28]. Under the resource framework
of coherence, it was recently observed that the coherence of a quantum state quantifies the extractable intrinsic
randomness by measuring it in the reference basis [16, 17].
To be more specific, let ρA denote the state of system A that is designed to generate random numbers. Consider a
purification of ρA as |ψ〉AE , i.e., TrE [|ψ〉AE〈ψ|AE ] = ρA with TrE as the partial trace over system E. In a randomness
analysis, the purification system E is normally assumed to be held by Eve, who aims at predicting the measurement
outcome of ρA by manipulating system E. Suppose a projective measurement on the I basis is performed on ρA,
then the joint state ρAE = |ψ〉AE〈ψ|AE becomes ρ′AE =
∑
i |i〉A〈i| ⊗ 〈i|AρAE |i〉A. Considering the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) scenario, the intrinsic randomness that is unpredictable to Eve, denoted by R(ρA), is
measured by the quantum conditional entropy S(A|E)ρ′AE . It is shown to be exactly characterized by the relative
entropy of coherence C(ρS) [16, 17],
R(ρA) = S(A|E)ρ′AE = C(ρA), (2)
where S(A|B) = S(ρAB) − S(ρB) is the conditional quantum entropy of ρAB . Therefore, the resource theory of
coherence provides a useful tool to quantify the intrinsic randomness in the reference basis.
At the end of this section, we clarify notations in the paper for clearness. The Z-basis is the reference basis of a
qubit, {|0〉, |1〉}. The X basis {|+〉, |−〉} and Y basis {|+i〉, |−i〉} are conjugate bases with |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2 and
|±i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i|1〉), respectively. Denote the Z-basis measurement result as Z. The Z-basis parity projectors on a
two-qubit space are
Π+ = |00〉 〈00|+ |11〉 〈11|,
Π− = |01〉 〈01|+ |10〉 〈10|. (3)
Similarly, for the X-basis and Y -basis, the projectors are
Π+x = |++〉〈++|+ |−−〉〈−−|,
Π−x = |+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+|,
Π+y = |+i− i〉〈+i− i|+ |−i+ i〉〈−i+ i|,
Π−y = |+i+ i〉〈+i+ i|+ |−i− i〉〈−i− i|.
(4)
Moreover, we define the partial dephasing channel on the Z basis as
Φ(ρ) = Π+ρΠ+ + Π−ρΠ−. (5)
III. SECURITY FRAMEWORK WITH COHERENCE
In this section, we provide a framework that relates the security analysis of QKD to the resource theory of coherence.
In QKD, Alice and Bob intend to share a sequence of private and identical bits, called secret key, via communication
4over an untrusted quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel. Eve can attack the communication
channels with any strategies allowed by the principles of quantum mechanics.
In the following discussions, we consider an entanglement-based QKD scheme, since the prepare-and-measure
schemes can be converted to the entanglement-based ones with the standard technique [19]. Also, we consider the
security analysis with respect to the condition that the shared states between Alice and Bob of different rounds are
i.i.d.. This is the collective attack scenario considered in QKD [29]. Then, a generic QKD protocol can be described
by the five points below.
(i) N pairs of qubit states, ρ⊗NAB , are distributed to Alice and Bob.
(ii) They randomly sample N − n copies of ρAB for parameter estimation, where 0 < n < N .
(iii) For the remaining n copies of ρAB , Alice and Bob each performs the Z-basis measurement to generate the raw
key.
(iv) They perform classical information reconciliation on the raw key to share identical keys.
(v) They perform privacy amplification based on the information provided in the parameter estimation to share
private keys.
In a security proof, the parameter estimation is a crucial step, which determines the amount of secure keys that
can be extracted in QKD. Essentially, Alice and Bob perform some measurement Γi ∈ Γ to estimate the information
of ρAB , with the probability of measurement outcome i being γi = Tr(ρABΓi). As a result, ρAB should fulfill a set
of constraints, ρAB ∈ S, where S denotes the set which contains all the states satisfying constraints from parameter
estimation,
S := {ρAB |Γ : Tr(ρABΓi) = γi}. (6)
Now we provide the main result of this paper, which connects the key rate of QKD with the relative entropy of
coherence. Our derivation is based on the close relation between intrinsic randomness and quantum coherence.
Theorem 1. In the asymptotic limit where n,N →∞, the secret key rate of the above QKD protocol is given by
K = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))− Iec, (7)
where Φ(·) is the partial dephasing operation defined in Eq. (5), C(·) is the relative entropy of coherence on the
computational basis ZA ⊗ ZB defined in Eq. (1), and Iec is the information leakage during key reconciliation.
Note that Iec in Eq. (7), which accounts for the private key consumed in the information reconciliation step, can
be directly estimated by the measurement statistics from parameter estimation. Sometimes parameter estimation
is not even needed here as long as an error verification step is applied after information reconciliation [30]. Thus,
the minimization is only on the first term that quantifies the security of the key by quantum coherence. Without
loss of generality, in the following analysis, we employ the one-way information reconciliation scheme such that
Iec = H(ZA|ZB) [31]. Here, the Shannon entropy of a random variable a and the conditional entropy of two random
variables a and b, are denoted by H(a) = −∑a q(a) log2 q(a) and H(a|b) = H(ab)−H(b), respectively, where q(a) is
the underlying probability distribution and H(e) = −e log2 e−(1−e) log2(1−e). We need to emphasize that our result
can be applied to more general postprocessing protocols, e.g., two-way classical-communication protocol [32]. This is
possible because our framework entirely decouples the privacy amplification step from the information reconciliation
step. In the following proof, we show an equivalent virtual protocol which employs quantum bit error correction that
commutes with the Z-basis measurement. This follows the same spirit of the Lo-Chau and Shor-Preskill proofs for
the BB84 protocol [19, 20].
Proof. Let K(ρAB) denote the key rate when the shared quantum state is known to be ρAB . To estimate the secret
key rate K, one should consider the worst case of ρAB ∈ S, i.e.
K = min
ρAB∈S
K(ρAB), (8)
where S is the set of quantum states ρAB that is consistent with the measurement statistics obtained in the parameter
estimation step, as defined in Eq. (6).
First, we consider an equivalent virtual protocol, where Alice and Bob perform the information reconciliation before
the Z-basis measurement, i.e., steps (iii) and (iv) in Box 1 are exchanged. Then, step (iii) and step (iv) are replaced
by
5(iii’) With the Z-basis measurement results obtained in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob perform quantum
bit error correction on the n copies of ρAB , which is equivalent to applying a global Z-basis parity projector
{Π+,Π−} on the joint state. Then, Alice (or Bob) applies the σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| to rotate all the joint states
to the subspace Π+.
(iv’) Alice and Bob perform the Z-basis measurement on the error corrected state to generate the identical key.
Note that the quantum bit error correction in step (iii’) commutes with the Z-basis measurement, since all operations
are performed in the Z basis. Thus, this virtual protocol is equivalent to the one shown in Box 1. The quantum bit
error correction in the virtual protocol can be realized with pre-shared nH(ZA|ZB) Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pairs. In the original protocol, the amount of key cost is given by the conditional entropy H(ZA|ZB). This step is
essentially classical. See Appendix A for more detailed discussions. We define the bit error rate eb = Tr(Π
−ρAB), and
H(ZA|ZB) ≤ H(eb), (9)
where the equality holds for the symmetric case.
After the quantum bit error correction step (iii’), the original ρ⊗nAB is transformed to n(1 − eb) copies of ρ+AB =
Π+ρABΠ
+/Tr(Π+ρAB) and neb copies of σ
B
x ρ
−
ABσ
B
x , with ρ
−
AB = Π
−ρABΠ−/Tr(Π−ρAB). In step (iv’), when Alice
and Bob measure these states in the Z basis, they will get identical keys.
To perform the privacy amplification in step (v), one essentially needs to characterize the amount of intrinsic
randomness in the error corrected keys that are unpredictable to Eve. Thus the key rate shows
K(ρAB) =
1
n
{
n(1− eb)R(ρ+AB) + nebR(σBx ρ−ABσBx )− nH(ZA|ZB)
}
. (10)
Recall the relation between intrinsic randomness and coherence shown in Eq. (2),
R(ρ) = C(ρ), (11)
where the reference basis of relative entropy of coherence C coincides with the basis ZA ⊗ ZB . Then we have
K(ρAB) =
1
n
{
n(1− eb)C(ρ+AB) + nebC(σBx ρ−ABσBx )− nH(ZA|ZB)
}
= (1− eb)C(ρ+AB) + ebC(ρ−AB)−H(ZA|ZB)
= C((1− eb)ρ+AB + ebρ−AB)−H(ZA|ZB)
= C(Φ(ρAB))−H(ZA|ZB),
(12)
where the third equality employs the additivity property of coherence and the Hilbert space of ρ+AB and ρ
−
AB are
orthogonal [33]. Inserting Eq. (12) into Eq. (8), one obtains Eq. (7).
Note that in the symmetric case, where the bit value of the raw key is evenly distributed, the information reconcil-
iation part is given by Eq. (9) with equality, then the key rate formula can be further written as,
K = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb). (13)
In general, for the asymmetric case, H(eb) ≥ H(ZA|ZB) on account of Fano’s inequality.
IV. KEY RATES OF BB84 AND SIX-STATE QKD
As examples, we apply the framework to the security analysis of the BB84 and six-state QKD protocols in the
collective-attack scenario. One can see that the secret key rates of these two protocols can be directly derived with
the tools well developed within the resource theory of coherence [4]. We list the results of these two re-derivations
as the following corollaries. Note that these two protocols only differ from each other on the measurement {Γi}
performed in parameter estimation. For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case, where Eq. (13) holds.
6A. BB84 protocol
Consider the entanglement-based version of BB84 protocol, where in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob obtain
the bit error rate eb = Tr(Π
−ρAB) and the phase error rate ep = Tr(Π−x ρAB). Then following Theorem 1, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The key rate of the BB84 QKD protocol KBB84 is given by
KBB84 = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
= 1−H(ep)−H(eb),
(14)
where S contains all the states yielding the same bit error rate eb and phase error rate ep obtained from parameter
estimation.
The result is consistent with the one from the Shor-Preskill security proof [19]. We prove this corollary by first
showing that K(ρAB) ≥ KBB84 for all ρAB ∈ S, and then giving a specific state in this set to saturate the inequality.
Proof. First note that the four eigenstates of ZA ⊗ ZB and XA ⊗ XB are a pair of mutually unbiased bases in the
four-dimensional system H2A⊗H2B . Denote ∆ZAB (∆XAB ) to be the projective measurement outcome on the ZA⊗ZB
(XA ⊗XB) basis. Due to the entropy uncertainty relation [34, 35], for any state ρ, we have
H(∆ZAB (ρ)) +H(∆XAB (ρ)) ≥ 2 + S(ρ). (15)
Hence the relative entropy of coherence in the Z basis satisfies [18]
CZAB (ρ) = H(∆ZAB (ρ))− S(ρ) ≥ 2−H(∆XAB (ρ)). (16)
Denoting the rank-2 projective measurement {Π+x ,Π−x } outcomes by ∆XX , one has the key rate in Eq. (13),
KBB84(ρAB) = C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
≥ 2−H(∆XAB (Φ(ρAB)))−H(eb)
= 1−H(∆XX(Φ(ρAB)))−H(eb),
= 1−H(ep)−H(eb)
(17)
where Eq. (16) is applied for state Φ(ρAB) in the second line. The third line holds due to the following reason. For
the state Φ(ρAB) which is the partially dephased state on Π
+ and Π− subspaces, it satisfies,
〈++|Φ(ρAB)|++〉 = 〈−−|Φ(ρAB)|−−〉 = 1− ep
2
,
〈+−|Φ(ρAB)|+−〉 = 〈−+|Φ(ρAB)|−+〉 = ep
2
.
(18)
That is, it has equal probabilities inside each of the rank-2 projectors of the X basis, thus H(∆XAB (Φ(ρAB))) =
1 +H(∆XX(Φ(ρAB))) = 1 +H(ep).
Finally, one can see that the Bell diagonal state, with probabilities on {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} being {(1− eb)(1−
ep), (1− eb)ep, eb(1− ep), ebep}, reaches the minimal key rate KBB84 in the state set S.
B. Six-state protocol
Consider the entanglement-based six-state protocol, where in parameter estimation, Alice and Bob perform the
measurement in the X, Y and Z basis respectively. Then, they estimate the error in these three basis ex = ep,
ey = Tr(Π
−
y ρAB), and ez = eb. Hence we have three parameters ex, ey and ez to constrain the state ρAB .
Suppose that the diagonal terms of ρAB , when represented in the Bell diagonal basis {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉}, is
{p0, p1, p2, p3} with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1. Note that these pi are directly related to the estimated error rates, i.e.,
ex = p1 + p3, (19)
ey = p1 + p2, (20)
ez = p2 + p3. (21)
Then following Theorem 1, we have the following corollary.
7Corollary 2. The key rate of the six-state QKD protocol Ksix is given by,
Ksix = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
= 1−H({pi}),
(22)
where S contains all the states yielding the same error rates ex, ey, and ez obtained from parameter estimation.
The result is consistent with the one from the previous security proof [24]. Note that the state set S is more
restrained compared to the one in the BB84 protocol. We prove this corollary by first showing that K(ρAB) ≥ Ksix
for all ρAB ∈ S, and then giving a specific state in this set to saturate the inequality.
Proof. Considering
∑
i pi = 1, with Eqs. (19) to (21) {pi} can be estimated by
p0 =
2− ex − ey − ez
2
,
p1 =
ex + ey − ez
2
,
p2 =
ey + ez − ex
2
,
p3 =
ez + ex − ey
2
.
(23)
Applying Eq. (13), the key rate is given by
Ksix(ρAB) = C(Φ(ρAB))−H(ez)
= (1− ez)C(ρ+AB) + ezC(ρ−AB)−H(ez)
≥ (1− ez)
[
1−H
(
p0
p0 + p1
)]
+ ez
[
1−H
(
p2
p2 + p3
)]
−H(ez)
= 1− (1− ez)H
(
p0
p0 + p1
)
− ezH
(
p2
p2 + p3
)
−H(ez)
= 1−H({pi}),
(24)
where in the last line we substitute the relation of ez in Eq. (21). The third line can be derived as follows. For the Z
and X bases, two mutually unbiased bases of a qubit, the uncertainty relation for coherence measures is given by [18]
CZ(ρ) = H(∆Z(ρ))− S(ρ) ≥ 1−H(∆X(ρ)). (25)
Since ρ+AB is rank-2, it can be viewed as a “qubit” state and the corresponding Z and X bases are Z
′ = {|00〉, |11〉}
and X ′ = {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉} respectively, where |Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2. Thus, applying Eq.(25) to ρ+AB , one has
CZ′(ρ
+
AB) ≥ 1−H(∆X′(ρ+AB)) = 1−H
(
p0
p0 + p1
)
. (26)
Similarly,
CZ′′(ρ
−
AB) ≥ 1−H(∆X′′(ρ−AB)) = 1−H
(
p2
p2 + p3
)
, (27)
where Z ′′ and X ′′ bases are {|01〉, |10〉} and {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} respectively, with |Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2. Based on
Eq. (26) and Eq. (27), we obtain the inequality in the third line of Eq. (24).
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that the Bell diagonal state with probabilities {p0, p1, p2, p3} reaches the
minimal key rate Ksix in the state set S.
V. IMPROVE THE KEY RATE WITH THE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we show that the above security proof framework allows us to improve the key rates using fine-
grained parameters obtained in the measurement outcomes. Essentially, if one can acquire more information about
8ρAB in the parameter estimation step, then the state set S in Eq. (7) will be constrained more tightly, and the key
rate can be improved.
Here we point out an important observation about Theorem 1. In order to estimate the secret key rate generated
by an unknown ρAB , it suffices to gain the information of Φ(ρAB), rather than the full information of ρAB . To be
more specific, Alice and Bob only need to estimate
Φ(ρAB) =
 m00 0 0 m030 m11 m12 00 m21 m22 0
m30 0 0 m33
 , (28)
where mij are the density matrix elements of ρAB in the Z basis,
∑
imii = 1, m12 = m
∗
21 and m03 = m
∗
30. The form
in Eq. (28) provides clear clues to improve the key rates. In the following two subsections, we show the refined key
rates for BB84 and six-state protocols with the tools from the resource theory of coherence.
A. BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol, the relations between the error rates eb, ep and the matrix elements of ρAB , as shown in
Eq.(28), are
eb = m11 +m22, (29)
ep = 1/2− Re[m03]− Re[m12]. (30)
In parameter estimation, Alice and Bob carry out ZA and ZB measurement, respectively. Thus from the measurement
results they can obtain not only the bit error rate eb, but also the four diagonal elements in the ZA ⊗ ZB basis, i.e.,
m00, m11, m22, m33. Hence the bit error rate eb can be seen as a coarse-grained parameter from the four diagonal
elements.
Based on this observation, we give the refined key rate formula for the BB84 protocol. First, let us define the
following optimization problem.
Problem 1. Minimize C(ρ(a, b)) that is subject to a+b = 1/2−ep, |a| ≤ √m00m33 and |b| ≤ √m11m22 with a, b ∈ R,
where C is the relative entropy of coherence, and
ρ(a, b) =
 m00 0 0 a0 m11 b 00 b m22 0
a 0 0 m33
 . (31)
This optimization problem can be efficiently solved via simple numerical methods. In addition, when the diagonal
elements satisfy m00/m33 = m11/m22 (or m00/m33 = m22/m11), it can be analytically solved, as shown in Lemma 1
in Appendix B. We have the following theorem to improve the key rate of the BB84 protocol.
Theorem 2. The secret key rate of the BB84 QKD protocol can be estimated via
KoptBB84 = C(ρ(a¯, b¯))−H(eb), (32)
where {a¯, b¯} is the solution to Problem 1.
Proof. From Eq. (13), we need to prove that
K = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
= KoptBB84,
(33)
where S contains all the states sharing the same diagonal elements m00, m11, m22, m33 and the phase error rate ep
obtained from parameter estimation.
Define σAB as the state by removing the imaginary parts of the off-diagonal terms in Φ(ρAB),
σAB =
 m00 0 0 Re[m03]0 m11 Re[m12] 00 Re[m21] m22 0
Re[m30] 0 0 m33
 . (34)
9It is clear that C(Φ(ρAB)) ≥ C(σAB), due to the fact that the magnitude of the off-diagonal elements is reduced.
Specifically, considering a qubit density matrix,
ρ =
(
β |c|eiϕ
|c|e−iϕ 1− β
)
, (35)
after applying the incoherent operation Oˆr(ρ) =
1
2UρU
† + 12ρ with U = |0〉〈0|+ e2iϕ|1〉〈1|, one can get,
Oˆr(ρ) =
(
β |c| cos(ϕ)
|c| cos(ϕ) 1− β
)
, (36)
where the imaginary parts of the off-diagonal terms are removed. As coherence does not increase under incoherent
operation, C(ρ) ≥ C(Oˆr(ρ)) [3].
Since Φ(ρAB) locates in the two rank-2 subspaces Π+ and Π−, similarly, one can get C(Φ(ρAB)) ≥ C(σAB) via
applying incoherent operations on these two subspaces respectively. As a result, for any state ρAB ∈ S,
K(ρAB) = C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
≥ C(σAB)−H(eb)
≥ min
σAB∈Sσ
C(σAB)−H(eb)
= C(ρ(a¯, b¯))−H(eb),
(37)
where Sσ consists of all the corresponding σAB from Φ(ρAB), and the last line is on account of the definition of
Problem 1. Note that σAB is also a quantum state belonging to the state set S, i.e., σAB ∈ S, thus the inequality
above can be saturated and we get Eq. (33).
Now we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For the BB84 QKD protocol, KoptBB84 in Eq.(32) generally yields a higher secret key rate than the
Shor-Preskill one, KBB84 in Eq. (14):
KoptBB84 ≥ KBB84. (38)
Corollary 3 can be directly obtained from Eqs. (14) and Eq. (33). Specifically, since more parameters are utilized
to constrain the state ρAB , the state set S in Eq. (33) is the subset of the one in Eq. (14). As a result, one has
KoptBB84 ≥ KBB84. The proof of Corollary 1 is based on the entropy uncertainty relation. Here, we prove Corollary
3 with the tools from the coherence theory [4]. In this way, one can clearly see when the inequality in Eq. (38) is
saturated.
Proof. Define Oˆij as the operation
Oˆij(ρ) =
1
2
SijρSij +
1
2
ρ, (39)
where Sij = |i〉 〈j|+ |j〉 〈i|. Then, we consider the state σ′AB = Oˆ12 ◦ Oˆ03(σAB), where σAB is defined in Eq.(34). Here
the labels {0, 1, 2, 3} represent the Z basis {|00〉, |01〉|10〉|11〉} respectively. And we have σ′AB ,
σ′AB =

1−eb
2 0 0 Re[m03]
0 eb2 Re[m12] 0
0 Re[m21]
eb
2 0
Re[m30] 0 0
1−eb
2
 , (40)
where the diagonal elements of the density matrix become equal in two subspaces Π+ and Π− respectively after the
operation. Clearly, Oˆij is an incoherent operation, thus the coherence of σ
′
AB is not larger than that of σAB , i.e.,
C(σAB) ≥ C(σ′AB). (41)
By definition, one has
KoptBB84 = minσAB∈Sσ C(σAB)−H(ez) (42)
≥ minσAB∈S′σ C(σ′AB)−H(ez),
where S ′σ contains all the states σ′AB obtained from σAB , as shown in Eq. (40). In fact, the minimization in the
second line is a special case of Problem 1. By applying Lemma 1 in Appendix B, one can get the minimal value,
1−H(ep)−H(eb). In the end, we have KoptBB84 ≥ KBB84.
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From Eq. (40), it is clear to see that KoptBB84 = KBB84 when the diagonal elements in the two subspaces Π
+ and
Π− are balanced, i.e., m00 = m33 and m11 = m22. In practice, in order to achieve this improvement of the key
rate, Alice and Bob need to replace the estimation of eb with more refined parameters m00, m11, m22, m33 in the
parameter estimation step, then perform privacy amplification with the updated key rate formula Eq. (32). Note that
this modification does not require extra quantum or classical communications between Alice and Bob.
B. Six-state protocol
Similar to the case of BB84 protocol, one can improve the key rate of six-state protocol by utilizing more refined
parameters, i.e., diagonal elements m00, m11, m22, m33, instead of the coarse-grained one, ez. Here, we provide the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. The secret key rate of six-state QKD protocol can be estimated via
Koptsix = C(τ)−H(ez), (43)
where
τ =
 m00 0 0 (1− ex − ey)/20 m11 (ey − ex)/2 00 (ey − ex)/2 m22 0
(1− ex − ey)/2 0 0 m33
 . (44)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Thereom 2. We need to prove that
K = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
= Koptsix ,
where S contains all the states sharing the same diagonal elements m00, m11, m22, m33 and the error rates ex and ey
obtained from parameter estimation. Recall Eq.(37),
K = min
ρAB∈S
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
≥ min
σAB∈Sσ
C(σAB)−H(ez),
(45)
where σAB is defined in Eq.(34). Here, Sσ = {τ} only has one element, since terms in σAB can all be determined by
parameter estimation in the six-state protocol. Namely, one has
ex = 1/2− Re[m03]− Re[m12], (46)
ey = 1/2− Re[m03] + Re[m12], (47)
ez = m11 +m22, (48)
while m00, m11, m22, m33 can be estimated with the ZA ⊗ ZB measurement. Inserting σAB = τ into Eq. (45) and
noting that τ ∈ S, we obtain Eq. (45).
Corollary 4. For the six-state QKD protocol, Koptsix in Eq. (43) generally yields a higher secret key rate than the
original one, Ksix in Eq. (22):
Koptsix ≥ Ksix. (49)
Like in the BB84 case, one can obtain Corollary 4 directly from Eqs. (22) and (45). Here we show a proof based
on the coherence theory [4].
Proof. Similar to the proof in Corollary 3, we apply the incoherent operation Oˆ on the state τ , and get τ ′ = Oˆ12◦Oˆ03(τ),
that is
τ ′ =

1−ez
2 0 0 (1− ex − ey)/2
0 ez2 (ey − ex)/2 0
0 (ey − ex)/2 ez2 0
(1− ex − ey)/2 0 0 1−ez2
 . (50)
11
Due to monotonicity of coherence under incoherent operation, one has
Koptsix = C(τ)−H(ez)
≥ C(τ ′)−H(ez)
= 1−H({pi})
= Ksix.
(51)
Here, we substitute the probabilities pi on the Bell diagonal basis for the error rates ex, ey, and ez with Eqs. (19) to
(21), and calculate the coherence C(τ ′).
From Eq. (50), it is clear to see that Koptsix = Ksix when the diagonal elements in the two subspaces Π
+ and Π−
are balanced, i.e. m00 = m33 and m11 = m22. In practice, to achieve this improvement of the key rate, Alice and
Bob need to replace the estimation of ez with the more refined parameters m00, m11, m22, m33 in the parameter
estimation step, then perform the privacy amplification with the updated key rate formula Eq. (43). Note that this
modification does not require extra quantum or classical communications between Alice and Bob.
Here, we have some remarks regarding the improvement of the key rates. In Secs. V A and V B, we have shown
that under the coherence-based framework, one can improve the key rates of BB84 and the six-state protocol with
fine-grained parameters. These key rate improvements can be understood as a fine-grained estimation of coherence in
Φ(ρAB). On the other hand, by utilizing other key rate formulas, such as the Devetak-Winter approach, one may also
get similar improvements of the key rates by using fine-grained parameters. See Appendix E for more discussions.
C. Numerical simulation
To illustrate the improvement on the security analysis via the coherence framework, we numerically compare the
four key rates analyzed above in Fig. 1, i.e., KBB84 in Eq. (14), K
opt
BB84 in Eq. (32), Ksix in Eq. (22) and K
opt
six in
Eq. (43). Here we set typical experimental parameters for simulation, and use a parameter α to describe the unbalance
of the diagonal elements of ρAB , i.e. m00/m33 = m22/m11 =
α
1−α .
0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
key rate
a
84BB OptK
84BBK
sixK
sixOptK
FIG. 1. (Color online) Key rate comparison of different schemes. We set ex(ep) = ey = ez(eb) = 3%. The parameter α
describes the unbalance of the diagonal elements, m00/m33 = m22/m11 =
α
1−α , where the region α ∈ [0.38, 0.62] is considered
to guarantee the non-negativity of the state ρAB . From top to bottom, the key rate plots are K
opt
six , Ksix, K
opt
BB84, and KBB84,
respectively.
The numerical result shows that the coherence-based key rate of the six-state protocol enjoys the highest key rate,
while the Shor-Preskill key rate of BB84 possesses the lowest key rate. As α = 0.5, that is, there is no unbalance of
diagonal elements, KoptBB84 = KBB84 and K
opt
six = Ksix; as α departs from 0.5, the unbalance becomes significant and
one can clearly see the improvements on the key rates.
We remark that the unbalance of the diagonal elements could happen in practical QKD scenarios. In the next
section, one can see that the asymmetry of the detectors can lead to this phenomenon [see ρZAB in Eq. (61) for an
example].
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VI. PRACTICAL ISSUE: DETECTION EFFICIENCY MISMATCH
In this section, we apply our coherence framework to QKD security analysis when considering a practical issue —
detection efficiency mismatch. Here, we focus on analyzing the BB84 protocol. We show that the key rate derived by
our framework is generally higher than in the previous analyses [36].
Ideally, the two detectors which detect |0〉 and |1〉 in Z basis (|+〉 and |−〉 in X basis) respectively are assumed
to be identical. However, in practical scenarios, there are always imperfections in the channels and detectors, which
may lead to different efficiencies for |0〉 and |1〉 (or |+〉 and |−〉) [37].
A. Detector model
In practice, the detection efficiency of a detector is normally related to other degrees of freedom of the input photons,
such as time, space, or spectrum [36]. For example, Fig. 2 shows the detection efficiency mismatch that is related
to the temporal degree of freedom of the injected photons. Employing the analytical methods in Ref. [36], here we
model the measurement by the two detectors on Bob’s side by the measurement of
M0 = η0|0〉B〈0|, (52)
M1 = η1|1〉B〈1|, (53)
where 0 ≤ η0, η1 ≤ 1 are the efficiencies of the two detectors. We assume η0 and η1 can be calibrated thus are known
to Alice and Bob.
Here, we decompose M0 and M1 by a filtering operation Fz and an ideal Z-basis measurement, where
Fz =
√
η0|0〉B〈0|+
√
η1|1〉B〈1|. (54)
Similarly, the measurement in the X basis with the two nonidentical detectors can be decomposed by a filtering
operation,
Fx =
√
η0|+〉B〈+|+
√
η1|−〉B〈−| (55)
followed by an ideal X-basis measurement {|+〉B〈+|, |−〉B〈−|}.
Under this decomposition, before the ideal Z-basis measurement, the state is transformed to
ρZAB =
FzρABFz
Tr(FzρABFz)
, (56)
and the obtained bit error rate is represented by
eb = Tr(Π
−ρZAB). (57)
Similarly, for the X-basis measurement, one has
ρXAB =
FxρABFx
Tr(FxρABFx)
, (58)
and the obtained phase error rate is
ep = Tr(Π
−
x ρ
X
AB), (59)
where Π−x = |+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+|. We remark that ep is not the phase error corresponding to the state measured
in the Z basis. That error should be
e′p = Tr(Π
−
x ρ
Z
AB). (60)
Note that the discrepancy between ep and e
′
p originates from the detection efficiency mismatch of the two detectors.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Illustration of detector efficiency mismatch in the time domain. Due to the optical path difference
between the two detectors, the two detectors have different detection efficiency in the time domain. If the arrival time of the
signal is t0, the efficiencies of the two detectors are the same. However, if the arrival time is t− or t+, the efficiency of Detector
0 (the solid blue line) is higher or lower.
B. Derivation of the key rate
Essentially, the task of deriving the final key rate is to estimate e′p with the knowledge of the measurement results
in the Z and X bases.
Let us explicitly write down ρZAB in Eq. (56),
ρZAB =
1
Γ
 η0m00 · ·
√
η0η1m03
· η1m11 √η0η1m12 ·
· √η0η1m21 η0m22 ·√
η0η1m30 · · η1m33
 , (61)
where the matrix elements that are not related to the parameter estimation are represented by “·”, and the normal-
ization factor is
Γ = η0m00 + η1m11 + η0m22 + η1m33. (62)
Employing Eq. (30), one has
e′p = 1/2−
√
η0η1
Γ
{Re[m03] + Re[m12]}, (63)
= 1/2−
√
η0η1
Γ
(1/2− e′′p),
where the second line applies Eq. (30) for e′′p , and e
′′
p is defined as
e′′p = Tr(Π
−
x ρAB). (64)
Actually, Γ and e′′p in Eq. (63) both can be obtained from measurement results. Denote the probabilities of obtaining
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, and |11〉 when both sides are measured in the Z basis by mˆ00, mˆ11, mˆ22 and mˆ33, respectively. Then
from Eq. (61) one has
mˆ00 = η0m00/Γ , mˆ11 = η1m11/Γ , (65)
mˆ22 = η0m22/Γ , mˆ33 = η1m33/Γ ,
Since m00 +m11 +m22 +m33 = 1, Γ can be represented as
Γ =
1
mˆ00/η0 + mˆ11/η1 + mˆ22/η0 + mˆ33/η1
. (66)
Similarly, one can explicitly write down ρXAB in Eq. (58) in the X basis,
ρXAB =
1
Γ′
 η0m
′
00 · ·
√
η0η1m
′
03
· η1m′11
√
η0η1m
′
12 ·
· √η0η1m′21 η0m′22 ·√
η0η1m
′
30 · · η1m′33
 , (67)
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where m′i,j denotes the matrix elements of ρAB in the X basis and the normalization factor is
Γ′ = η0m′00 + η1m
′
11 + η0m
′
22 + η0m
′
22. (68)
Denote the probabilities of obtaining |++〉, |+−〉, |−+〉, and |−−〉 when both sides are measured in the X basis by
mˆ′00, mˆ
′
11, mˆ
′
22 and mˆ
′
33, respectively. Then one has
mˆ′00 = η0m
′
00/Γ
′ , mˆ′11 = η1m
′
11/Γ
′ , (69)
mˆ′22 = η0m
′
22/Γ
′ , mˆ′33 = η1m
′
33/Γ
′ .
Similarly to Γ in Eq. (66) for the Z basis, Γ′ can be represented as
Γ′ =
1
mˆ′00/η0 + mˆ
′
11/η1 + mˆ
′
22/η0 + mˆ
′
33/η1
. (70)
By the definition in Eq. (64), we have
e′′p = m
′
11 +m
′
22 (71)
= Γ′(mˆ′11/η1 + mˆ
′
22/η0).
With Eqs. (63), (66), (70) and (71), the phase error e′p can be precisely estimated from the measurement results
in Z and X bases. By contrast, e′p is roughly upper bounded in previous results [36]. This precise estimation of e
′
p
allows Alice and Bob to obtain a higher key rate than in the previous analysis. Also, the key rate can be further
improved by applying Theorem 2 to ρZAB .
Therefore, with fine-grained parameters, one can expect a higher key rate than the previous ones. This is to be
illustrated in the following subsection.
C. Analytical key rate formula under symmetric attack
To simplify the analysis, we assume Eve’s attack to be symmetric between bits 0 and 1 in the Z/X-basis, i.e., the
diagonal elements of ρAB in both the Z basis and the X basis are balanced. That is
m00 = m33 = c, (72)
m11 = m22 = d,
with the normalization condition 2(c+ d) = 1. Meanwhile, for the X basis, one has
m′00 = m
′
33 = c
′, (73)
m′11 = m
′
22 = d
′,
with 2(c′ + d′) = 1. Then via Eq. (62), one has
Γ = η0c+ η1d+ η0d+ η1c (74)
= (η0 + η1)(c+ d)
= (η0 + η1)/2,
where Γ is a constant related to the detection efficiency.
With Eqs. (59), (67) and (68), one has
ep = (η1m
′
11 + η0m
′
22)/Γ
′ (75)
=
η1m
′
11 + η0m
′
22
η0m′00 + η1m
′
11 + η0m
′
10 + η1m
′
22
=
(η0 + η1)d
′
(η0 + η1)(c′ + d′)
= e′′p ,
where the last line is on account of the definition of e′′p . Inserting Eqs. (74) and (75) into Eq. (63), we have
e′p = 1/2−
2
√
η0η1
η0 + η1
(1/2− ep), (76)
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which means e′p can be precisely estimated with ep.
With Eq. (76), one can estimate the key rate by applying Theorem 2. For the current scenario that is restricted
to the symmetric attack, the optimization Problem 1 can be solved analytically. See Appendix C for a detailed
derivation. The key rate is given by
K = H(x)−H(f(x, ep))−H(eb), (77)
where
x = η0η0+η1 ,
f(x, ep) = 1/2 +
√
(1/2− x)2 + x(1− x)(1− 2ep)2.
Comparatively, Ref. [36] proposes two methods of analyzing the key rate with the detection efficiency mismatch
issue. There, one key rate formula is obtained via the data discarding process,
K1 =
2min{η0, η1}
η0 + η1
(
1−H(ep)−H(eb)
)
. (78)
The other key rate is obtained via a virtual protocol based on Koashi’s complimentary approach [38],
K2 =
2min{η0, η1}
η0 + η1
(
1−H(ep)
)
−H(eb). (79)
To compare above key rates, K, K1 and K2, we first consider the noiseless case, where ep = eb = 0. Then, one has
K = H( η0η0+η1 ) and K1 = K2 =
2min{η0,η1}
η0+η1
. It is clear that K ≥ K1 = K2. In the noisy case, the key rates obtained
from the three analysis are plotted in Fig. 3. It shows that K is larger than K2 for any efficiency mismatch extent;
while K is larger than K1 if the mismatch is not too serious. This manifests the advantage of coherence framework
for analyzing QKD security.
When the efficiency mismatch becomes large (x approaches 0 in Fig. 3), K becomes negative; but K1 keeps positive
and thus larger than K. This fact can be understood as follows. Suppose the initial state before measurement ρAB
possesses positive key rate (bit and phase error are both small). The data discarding approach effectively transforms
the state ρZAB to ρAB with probability
2min{η0,η1}
η0+η1
, thus the key rate K1 is always positive. As x → 0 (η0 → 0),
the probability of successful transform approaches 0, thus K1 → 0. On the other hand, as x → 0, the phase error
of the state ρZAB in Eq. (76) approaches 1/2. Consequently, the first two terms in Eq.(77) approaches zero, and
K → −H(eb) ≤ 0 .
x
key rate
1K
2K
K
FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison between the key rates obtained from three analyses targeting the detection efficiency
mismatch issue. The solid blue, dashed green and dotted red curves represent K, K1 and K2, respectively. We set ep = eb = 5%,
and plot the key rates versus x = η0
η0+η1
, which describes the efficiency mismatch. Without loss of generality, we assume η0 ≤ η1
and hence 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5.
VII. RELATION WITH ENTANGLEMENT
The existing security analyses [19, 20] usually starts from entanglement distillation protocols [25, 39], where entan-
glement is taken as an essential resource to deliver the security of the final key. In contrast, our work is based on the
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relation between quantum coherence and intrinsic randomness, which is related to the security in QRNG and QKD.
Specifically, after correcting the bit errors, we take Alice and Bob as a whole and analyze the intrinsic randomness
out of reach of Eve. From this point of view, our approach shares similarity with Koashi’s, which is based on the
complementary arguments for the joint system [38]. In addition, recently there have been several works considering
the interplay between coherence and entanglement [40, 41]. However, we remark that in these works the authors nor-
mally investigate converting subsystem coherence (not the coherence in the bipartite system) into global correlations
and the incoherent operations used there cannot be directly applied into the QKD security analysis.
Here, we show some relations between our key rate and the entanglement property of the input state ρAB . As
shown in Eq. (13), the key rate can be enhanced if Alice and Bob acquire more information of the shared state ρAB
and estimate the coherence of Φ(ρAB) more accurately. Suppose Alice and Bob perform a full tomography of ρAB in
the parameter estimation step, then the state set S only contains one state ρAB . An upper bound for the key rate is
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a protocol in which a full tomography on ρAB is performed in the parameter estimation,
then the key rate is upper bounded by
K(ρAB) = C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb) ≤ S(TrA(Φ(ρAB)))− S(Φ(ρAB)). (80)
Note that the right side of Eq. (80) is the hashing inequality for the state Φ(ρAB), which is a lower bound for
one-way LOCC (local operations and classical communication) entanglement distillation protocol [29, 39]. We remark
that the projection operation Φ on state ρAB is a nonlocal operation, hence our analysis framework based on coherence
could potentially yield higher key rate than the usual entanglement distillation analysis. For conciseness, we leave
the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix D. We also compare our key rate with the Devetak-Winter formula [29] in
Appendix E.
Now we define a key rate that is independent of measurement basis by maximizing the key rate generated by state
ρAB over all local bases, i.e.,
Km(ρAB) = max
ZA⊗ZB
{
C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb)
}
, (81)
where ZA ⊗ ZB labels all the local bases of Alice and Bob.
One can see that given a pure state |ΨAB〉, the maximal key rate is its entanglement entropy, i.e., Km(ΨAB) =
S(ρA), with ΨAB = |ΨAB〉〈ΨAB | and ρA = TrB(ΨAB). To be specific, suppose |Ψ〉AB = a0|ψ0〉A|ψ′0〉B+a1|ψ1〉A|ψ′1〉B
is the the Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ〉AB , one can choose {|ψ0〉A, |ψ1〉A} and {|ψ′0〉B , |ψ′1〉B} as the optimal local
basis that maximizes the key rate. In addition, it is clear for a product state |ΨAB〉 = |ψ0〉A|ψ′0〉B the maximal key
rate is zero. And the following proposition gives an upper bound for the maximal key rate for general state.
Proposition 2. The maximal key rate of the state ρAB optimized over all local bases is upper bounded by the entan-
glement of formation,
Km(ρAB) ≤ min{pi,Ψi}
∑
i
piK
m(Ψi) = E
form(ρAB), (82)
where the minimization is over all the convex decompositions of ρAB =
∑
piΨi.
Proof. Note that the key rate K is convex due to the convexity of the relative entropy of coherence and the concavity
of the von Neumann entropy. Hence, for any decomposition of ρAB =
∑
piΨi,
Km(ρAB) = K(ρAB)ZoA⊗ZoB ≤
∑
i
piK(Ψi)ZoA⊗ZoB ≤
∑
i
piK
m(Ψi), (83)
where ZoA⊗ZoB represents the optimal local basis for ρAB and the last inequality holds since one can improve the key
rate of Ψi further by choosing specific optimal basis for each of them. Consequently, the maximal key rate is upper
bounded by the entanglement of formation as shown in Eq. (82).
It is also clear to see that the key rate for any separable state Km(ρsepAB) ≤ 0, since it can be written as the
combination of product states [26].
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have proposed a framework that captures the close relation between coherence and QKD. By considering a
generic entanglement-based QKD protocol, the framework shows that the secure key rate can be quantified via the
coherence of the shared bipartite quantum states. By applying the proposed framework to the BB84 and six-state
protocols, we reproduce the key rates. Furthermore, the framework can even allow us to improve the key rates by
modifying the postprocessing. And it is also shown to be advantageous to analyze the practical issue of detector
efficiency mismatch in QKD. More generally, the coherence-based framework also provide us convenience to analyze
the key rate by using tools from coherence theory.
Along this direction, a number of problems can be explored in the future. Note that our current security analysis is
performed under the collective attack scenario. An important future study is to extend the results to the scenario of
coherent attacks and take into account finite-key effects [42, 43]. To solve this problem, one may employ results from
recent studies on one-shot coherence theories [44–46]. There, coherence can be quantified in a non-asymptotic setting
where finite data-size effects appear. Also, apart from the currently studied cases, the framework has potential to be
applied to many other QKD protocols, such as the three-state protocol [47, 48] and B92 protocol [49], where similar
derivation and improvement of the key rate are expected. In particular, the framework can be naturally extended to
measurement-device-independent QKD [50], since bipartite quantum states are directly distributed and measured in
this kind of protocol. In addition, generalization to high dimensional QKD and continuous-variable QKD [51] is also
interesting. Also, we expect our framework to be useful in addressing more practical issues in QKD, the solutions to
many of which are missing or very complicated at the moment.
Moreover, it is intriguing to reexamine the previous QKD security analyses from the coherence theory point of
view. To be specific, a common technique of security analysis is to transform the original protocol to the equivalent
virtual protocol. The latter is easier to analyze but share the same amount of secure keys. In the virtual protocol,
the operations conducted there are incoherent operations [4] (more specifically, dephasing-covariant incoherent opera-
tion [52, 53]), which commute with the final Z-basis measurement to generate keys. It is also interesting to investigate
the connection between coherence and entanglement [40, 41, 54–56] under the scenario of security analysis. This
topic might not only deepen our understanding of the basic quantum resources, but also inspire useful applications
in quantum information processing.
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Appendix A: Quantum bit error correction
We first clarify the information reconciliation of the original protocol in (i)-(v), and then convert it to a quantum
version, the quantum bit error correction of the virtual protocol.
In the original protocol, after the Z-basis measurement on ρ⊗nAB , Alice and Bob get n-bit strings ZnA and ZnB ,
respectively. Due to errors, the random variables ZnA and ZnB are not identical in general. Then, in (linear) error
correction, Alice generate an error syndrome by hashing her bit string with an nH(ZA|ZB) × n random binary
matrix. By consuming nH(ZA|ZB) preshared secret bits, Alice sends the syndrome to Bob safely with the one-time-
pad encryption. After obtaining the syndromes, Bob can correct the corresponding error bits.
In the virtual protocol, the quantum bit error correction is executed before the Z-basis measurement. Specifically,
Alice and Bob now share nH(ZA|ZB) EPR pairs. First, they use their state ρ⊗nAB to control the EPR pairs according
to the hashing matrix separately, where the ancillary EPR pairs act as the target of the CNOT gate. Second, they
measure the EPR pairs in the Z basis separately and get the measurement results ZaA and ZaB , where a labels the
ancilla. Then Alice sends ZaA to Bob and Bob obtains the error syndrome via bitwise binary addition ZaA ⊕ ZaB .
Finally, Bob locates the bit errors and applies the σx operation to correct them. Here, it is clear that the quantum
bit error correction commutes with the Z-basis measurement. Take a simple example, where
H2×3 =
(
1 1 0
0 1 1
)
; (A1)
the circuit is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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}ancillaEPR pairs
Alice Bob
nH(ZA|ZB)
FIG. 4. The circuit for quantum bit error correction. Alice and Bob separately use their state ρ⊗nAB to control the EPR pairs
according to a nH(ZA|ZB) × n hashing matrix with n → ∞. Here for clearness we show the schematic with a 2 × 3 hashing
matrix H2×3 given in Eq. (A1).
Appendix B: Analytical solution to Problem 1
Lemma 1. If the four diagonal elements of the density matrix in Eq. (31) satisfy m00/m33 = m11/m22 =
α
1−α (or m00/m33 = m22/m11), the minimal coherence obtained from the optimization in Problem 1 is H(α) −
H
(
1
2 +
√
(α− 12 )2 + ( 12 − ep)2
)
, with the solution a¯ = (1− eb)(1/2− ep) and b¯ = eb(1/2− ep).
Proof. Here, we only consider the case m00/m33 = m11/m22, and the proof for the other case m¯00/m¯33 = m¯22/m¯11
can proceed in a similar way.
Due to the additivity property of coherence, we can express the coherence of ρ(a, b), like in Eq.(12), as
C(ρ(a, b)) = (1− eb)C(ρ+) + ebC(ρ−) (B1)
where ρ+(−) = Π+(−)ρ(a, b)Π+(−)/Tr(Π+(−)ρ(a, b)). With m00/m33 = m11/m22 = α1−α , we can explicitly write down
the matrix form of ρ+(−) as,
ρ+ =
(
α a′
a′ 1− α
)
, ρ− =
(
α b′
b′ 1− α
)
, (B2)
where (1− eb)a′ = a and ebb′ = b.
The relative entropy of coherence of the state ρ+ is,
C(ρ+) = S(∆(ρ+))− S(ρ+), (B3)
= H(α)−H
(
1
2
+
√
(α− 1
2
)2 + |a′|2
)
,
where ∆(·) is the dephasing operation of the {|00〉, |11〉} basis. For simplicity, we denote g(x) = 12 +
√
γ + x2, where
γ = (α− 12 )2, hence
C(ρ+) = H(α)−H(g(|a′|)). (B4)
And similarly for ρ−, we have
C(ρ−) = H(α)−H(g(|b′|)). (B5)
In fact, g(x) is a monotonically increasing convex function, on account of
g′(x) = x√
γ+x2
≥ 0, (B6)
g′′(x) = γ
(γ+x2)
3
2
> 0.
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Moreover we can show that H
(
g(x)
)
is a concave function. Specifically, for two variables x1, x2 with probability p1,
p2, ∑
i
piH
(
g(xi)
) ≤ H(∑
i
pig(xi)
)
≤ H
(
g
(∑
i
pixi
))
, (B7)
where the summation i = 1, 2. The first inequality is due to the concavity of the entropy function H(x). The second
inequality holds because of three facts: g(x) is a convex function, i.e.,
∑
i pig(xi) ≥ g
(∑
i pixi
)
; g(x) is larger than
1
2 ; H(x) monotonically decreases as x ≥ 12 .
Then inserting Eq. (B4) and (B5) into Eq. (B1), and utilizing the concavity of H(g(x)), we have
C(ρ(a, b)) = H(α)− (1− eb)H(g(|a′|))− ebH(g(|b′|)) (B8)
≥ H(α)−H(g([1− eb]|a′|+ eb|b′|)),
where the equality holds when |a′| = |b′|.
Remembering that the coherence C(ρ(a, b)) should be minimized under the constraint a+b = (1−eb)a′+ebb′ = 12−ep,
we have
(1− eb)|a′|+ eb|b′| ≥ |(1− eb)a′ + ebb′| = |1
2
− ep|, (B9)
where the equality is saturated when a′ and b′ share the same sign. Consequently, following Eq. (B8), we have
C(ρ(a, b)) ≥ H(α)−H(g([1− eb]|a′|+ eb|b′|)) (B10)
≥ H(α)−H(g(|1
2
− ep|)),
where the second inequality holds sinceH(g(x)) is a monotonically decreasing function. And the inequality is saturated
when a¯ = (1− eb)(1/2− ep) and b¯ = eb(1/2− ep).
Appendix C: Derivation of the key rate K in Eq. (77)
Here we derive the key rate for the symmetric attack scenario, where the key is generated from the Z-basis bit of
ρZAB . Under the symmetric assumption in Eq. (72), the four diagonal elements in the Z-basis of ρ
Z
AB are, 2c
η0
η0+η1
,
2d η1η0+η1 , 2d
η0
η0+η1
, and 2c η1η0+η1 respectively. And the phase error e
′
p is given by Eq. (76). Consequently, the coherence
minimization of Problem 1 becomes
ρ(a, b) =

2c η0η0+η1 0 0 a
0 2d η1η0+η1 b 0
0 b 2d η0η0+η1 0
a 0 0 2c η1η0+η1
 , (C1)
where a + b = 12 − e′p. It is clear to find that this minimization satisfies the condition in Lemma 1 with α = η0η0+η1 .
Hence, according to Theorem 2, the key rate reads
K = H(α)−H
(
1/2 +
√
(α− 1
2
)2 + (
1
2
− e′p)2
)
−H(eb) (C2)
= H(α)−H
(
1/2 +
√
(α− 1
2
)2 + α(1− α)(1− 2ep)2
)
−H(eb),
where Eq. (76) is applied in the third line to express e′p with ep. If we substitute x for α in the above equation, we
get the key rate in Eq. (77) in the main part.
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1
From Eq. (12), one has C(Φ(ρAB)) = (1− eb)C(ρ+AB) + ebC(ρ−AB). By definition [3],
C(ρ+AB) = S(ρ
+diag
AB )− S(ρ+AB) (D1)
= LS(ρ+B)− S(ρ+AB),
where ρ+B = TrB(ρ
+
AB). Here in the second line we utilize the fact that S(ρ
+
B) = S(ρ
+diag
AB ), since ρ
+
AB is in the Π
+
subspace. Similarly, one has
C(ρ−AB) = S(ρ
−
B)− S(ρ−AB). (D2)
As a result,
K(ρAB) = C(Φ(ρAB))−H(eb) (D3)
= (1− eb)
(
S(ρ+B)− S(ρ+AB)
)
+ eb
(
S(ρ−B)− S(ρ−AB)
)
−H(eb)
= (1− eb)S(ρ+B) + ebS(ρ−B)−
(
(1− eb)S(ρ+AB) + ebS(ρ−AB) +H(eb)
)
,
≤ S((1− eb)ρ+B + ebρ−B)− S(Φ(ρAB)),
= S
(
(1− eb)TrA(ρ+AB) + ebTrA(ρ−AB)
)
− S(Φ(ρAB)),
= S(TrA(Φ(ρAB)))− S(Φ(ρAB)),
where the inequality in the fourth line is due to the concavity of entropy.
Appendix E: Comparison with the Devetak-Winter formula
The Devetak-Winter formula shows that the key rate of state ρAB in the i.i.d. scenario is KD−W = S(ZA|E) −
H(ZA|ZB). This formula considers the one-way information reconciliation protocol. And in this case, the information
reconciliation term H(ZA|ZB) is the same as in our formula. Note that our formula Eq. (1) can be applied to
more general information reconciliation protocols, whereas the Devetak-Winter one is originally designed for one-way
postprocessing. Thus, we focus on the first term S(ZA|E) which is used to estimate the privacy of the sifted key on
Alice’s side. In fact, it can be written in the relative entropy form [54, 57] as
S(ZA|E) = D(ρAB‖∆ZA(ρAB)), (E1)
where ∆ZA is the partial dephasing operation on system A, i.e., ∆ZA(ρAB) =
∑
i=0,1 |i〉A〈i|ρAB |i〉A〈i|. Here S(ZA|E)
equals to the amount of basis-dependent discord of ρAB [58].
On the other hand, the term corresponding to privacy, C(Φ(ρAB)) in our key formula in Eq. (7), can also be written
in the relative entropy form. By definition [3], we have
C(Φ(ρAB)) = D(Φ(ρAB)‖∆ZAB (Φ(ρAB))). (E2)
Compared with Eq. (E1) of Devetak-Winter formula, C(Φ(ρAB)) quantifies the global coherence of Φ(ρAB).
It is enlightening to note that using the same fine-grained parameters, one can achieve the same key rate improve-
ment from the Devetak-Winter formula as our coherence framework. Here is the proof. As shown in Eq. (31), ρAB
constrained by the fine-grained parameters in the BB84 protocol satisfies ρAB = Φ(ρAB). Similarly, Eq. (44) shows
that ρAB = Φ(ρAB) is also satisfied for ρAB constrained by the fine-grained parameters in the six-state protocol.
Therefore, for both protocols, one has
C(Φ(ρAB)) = D(Φ(ρAB)‖∆ZAB (Φ(ρAB))) (E3)
= D(Φ(ρAB)‖∆ZA(Φ(ρAB)))
= D(ρAB‖∆ZA(ρAB))
= S(ZA|E)
where the second equality employs the fact that ∆ZA(Φ(·)) = ∆ZAB (Φ(·)) and the third equality employs ρAB =
Φ(ρAB).
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Therefore, with the fine-grained parameters, KD−W is equal to the key rate formula (1). This implies one can
derive the same improved key rate formulas as those in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, from the Devetak-Winter formula
with fine-grained parameters.
[1] M. Born, Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 37, 863 (1926).
[2] E. Schro¨dinger, Naturwissenschaften 23, 807 (1935).
[3] T. Baumgratz, M. Cramer, and M. B. Plenio, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140401 (2014).
[4] A. Streltsov, G. Adesso, and M. B. Plenio, Rev. Mod. Phys. 89, 041003 (2017).
[5] S. L. Braunstein, C. M. Caves, and G. Milburn, Annals of Physics 247, 135 (1996).
[6] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum computation and quantum information (Cambridge university press, 2010).
[7] J. A˚berg, Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 150402 (2014).
[8] M. Lostaglio, D. Jennings, and T. Rudolph, Nature Communications 6, 6383 (2015).
[9] S. Huelga and M. Plenio, Contemporary Physics 54, 181 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/00405000.2013.829687.
[10] M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 93, 012111 (2016).
[11] J. M. Matera, D. Egloff, N. Killoran, and M. B. Plenio, Quantum Science and Technology 1, 01LT01 (2016).
[12] I. Marvian, R. W. Spekkens, and P. Zanardi, Phys. Rev. A 93, 052331 (2016).
[13] C. Napoli, T. R. Bromley, M. Cianciaruso, M. Piani, N. Johnston, and G. Adesso, Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 150502 (2016).
[14] M. Lostaglio, K. Korzekwa, D. Jennings, and T. Rudolph, Physical Review X 5, 021001 (2015).
[15] E. Bagan, J. A. Bergou, S. S. Cottrell, and M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 160406 (2016).
[16] X. Yuan, H. Zhou, Z. Cao, and X. Ma, Phys. Rev. A 92, 022124 (2015).
[17] X. Yuan, Q. Zhao, D. Girolami, and X. Ma, arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07818 (2016).
[18] J. Ma, A. Hakande, X. Yuan, and X. Ma, Phys. Rev. A 99, 022328 (2019).
[19] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[20] H. K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[21] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal
Processing (IEEE Press, New York, 1984) pp. 175–179.
[22] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[23] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
[24] H.-K. Lo, Quantum Info. Comput. 1, 81 (2001).
[25] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Popescu, B. Schumacher, J. A. Smolin, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 722
(1996).
[26] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 217903 (2004).
[27] X. Ma, X. Yuan, Z. Cao, B. Qi, and Z. Zhang, npj Quantum Information 2, 16021 (2016).
[28] M. Herrero-Collantes and J. C. Garcia-Escartin, Rev. Mod. Phys. 89, 015004 (2017).
[29] I. Devetak and A. Winter, in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering
Sciences, Vol. 461 (The Royal Society, 2005) pp. 207–235.
[30] C.-H. F. Fung, X. Ma, and H. F. Chau, Phys. Rev. A 81, 012318 (2010).
[31] Here, one-way information reconciliation means that in the post-processing stage, Alice (or Bob) could determine the final
key from her (or his) sifted key directly. For example, one can use Alice’s sifted key after privacy-amplification hashing as
the final key.
[32] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 49, 457 (2003).
[33] X.-D. Yu, D.-J. Zhang, G. F. Xu, and D. M. Tong, Phys. Rev. A 94, 060302(R) (2016).
[34] H. Maassen and J. B. M. Uffink, Physical Review Letters 60, 1103 (1988).
[35] M. Berta, M. Christandl, R. Colbeck, J. M. Renes, and R. Renner, Nature Physics 6, 659 (2010).
[36] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, Quantum Information & Computation 9, 131 (2009).
[37] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo, Physical Review A 78, 042333 (2008).
[38] M. Koashi, New Journal of Physics 11, 045018 (2009).
[39] R. Horodecki, P. Horodecki, M. Horodecki, and K. Horodecki, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 865 (2009).
[40] J. Ma, B. Yadin, D. Girolami, V. Vedral, and M. Gu, Physical Review Letters 116, 160407 (2016).
[41] A. Streltsov, U. Singh, H. S. Dhar, M. N. Bera, and G. Adesso, Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 020403 (2015).
[42] R. Renner, arXiv preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0512258 (2005).
[43] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, J.-C. Boileau, and H. Chau, Computers & Security 30, 172 (2011).
[44] Q. Zhao, Y. Liu, X. Yuan, E. Chitambar, and X. Ma, Phys. Rev. Lett. 120, 070403 (2018).
[45] Q. Zhao, Y. Liu, X. Yuan, E. Chitambar, and A. Winter, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory , 1 (2019).
[46] B. Regula, K. Fang, X. Wang, and G. Adesso, Phys. Rev. Lett. 121, 010401 (2018).
[47] J.-C. Boileau, K. Tamaki, J. Batuwantudawe, R. Laflamme, and J. M. Renes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 040503 (2005).
[48] C.-H. F. Fung and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 74, 042342 (2006).
[49] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[50] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 130503 (2012).
[51] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81, 1301
22
(2009).
[52] E. Chitambar and G. Gour, Phys. Rev. Lett. 117, 030401 (2016).
[53] I. Marvian and R. W. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 94, 052324 (2016).
[54] P. J. Coles, Phys. Rev. A 85, 042103 (2012).
[55] Y. Yao, X. Xiao, L. Ge, and C. P. Sun, Phys. Rev. A 92, 022112 (2015).
[56] A. Streltsov, S. Rana, M. N. Bera, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. X 7, 011024 (2017).
[57] P. J. Coles, E. M. Metodiev, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Nature Communications 7, 11712 (2016).
[58] K. Modi, A. Brodutch, H. Cable, T. Paterek, and V. Vedral, Rev. Mod. Phys. 84, 1655 (2012).
